Israeli forces -------- shell southern
Lebanon, target olive harvesters
November 9th, at 4:39pm
(Al Mayadeen English)
Israeli forces intensify attacks on southern Lebanon
through airstrikes, artillery shelling, demolitions,
and measures targeting farmers, in continued
ceasefire violations.
Israeli forces continued attacks across several areas
of southern Lebanon on Monday, carrying out
airstrikes and artillery shelling, demolitions,
and measures restricting farmers from
harvesting their crops.
Israeli warplanes conducted two airstrikes on the town
of Qantara in the Marjayoun district and another on
Kfar Tebnit in the Nabatieh district. An Israeli
drone also struck the Jarmaq area in the
Jezzine district.
Israeli artillery shelling targeted the outskirts of Haris,
Baraachit, Mansouri, Kfar Tebnit, and Zawtar al-
Sharqiyah, as well as Wadi al-Hujair and Wadi
al-Salouqi. The city of Khiam, and the
outskirts of Shwaya in the Hasbaya
district were also shelled.
Israeli forces continue to demolish
houses in Bint Jbeil district
Meanwhile, Israeli forces continued demolition operations
in southern Lebanese towns under occupation, with two
explosions reported between Baraachit and Aitaroun
in the Bint Jbeil district.
Israeli forces also targeted farmers working in border areas.
An Israeli drone dropped a sound bomb toward farmers
harvesting olives on the outskirts of Deir Mimas
in the Marjayoun district.
In a separate incursion, four Israeli tanks and several
military vehicles entered Kfar Shouba from its
eastern side and took up positions near
residential buildings.
The attacks constitute further Israeli violations of the
ceasefire agreement, the cessation of hostilities
announcement issued on November 27, 2024,
and relevant United Nations resolutions,
particularly Resolutions 425
and 1701.
Lebanese Army chief identifies
Israeli occupation as country's
main security threat
Lebanese Army Commander, General Rodolphe Haykal,
identified "Israel's" continued occupation of Lebanese
territory --- as the country's primary security threat,
warning that ongoing attacks in the south -- were
causing casualties and destruction - in violation
of international law & existing understandings.
Speaking at a meeting with senior military officers at army
headquarters in Yarzeh on November 6, Haykal said the
military would not allow internal disputes to threaten
Lebanon's stability. "The army's message --- is
national, and its only policy..... is the national
policy," he said, reaffirming the institution's
commitment to national unity, civil peace,
and sovereignty.
Source: Al Mayadeen
________________________________________
Editor's Choice
Inside Iran’s expanding target bank: The US-Israeli
infrastructure at risk ---- in the event of wider war
by Arman Shariati
November 9th, 12:43pm GMT
(PressTV)
Iran warns that further US-Israeli attacks - could
provoke retaliation against a widening range of
targets, threatening regional infrastructure,
global energy supplies, and economic
stability. We examine Iran’s
expanded target bank.
The current talking points emerging from both the military and
civilian leadership in Tehran carry a tone markedly different
from anything we have heard before. Gone are the careful
hedges, diplomatic qualifiers, and attempts to preserve
ambiguity as a tool of de-escalation.
In their place is something colder -- and more deliberate: a
growing conviction across Iran’s command structure that
another round of aggression between Iran and the US-
Israeli axis is not merely possible but increasingly
probable – and that Iran’s response, should it
occur, will bear little resemblance ---- to
anything we have witnessed before.
Tehran has demonstrated its ability to withstand both military
and economic pressure. That is the single most important
fact that policymakers in Washington and Tel Aviv seem
incapable of grasping. Months of maritime siege,
economic warfare - threats of renewed strikes
on Iranian nuclear & industrial infrastructure,
assassination campaigns.... and sabotage
operations --- have failed to produce the
outcome... their architects promised.
Iran has not fractured from within. Its military command has
not splintered, nor has its strategic doctrine collapsed
under the weight of mounting pressure. Instead, that
pressure has hardened Iran’s resolve & accelerated
its preparations.
In what may prove to be the most consequential development
of this period, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah
Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, held an in-person meeting with
the heads of the country’s military branches last week.
Those in attendance included - Chief of the General Staff Maj.
Gen. Ali Abdollahi, Army Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Amir
Hatami, and IRGC Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Ahmad
Vahidi – the top brass of the Iranian armed forces.
This was no routine briefing. During the meeting, Ayatollah
Khamenei delivered an explicit message: Iran’s armed
forces must maintain the highest possible state of
readiness to counter enemy plots. Any renewed
aggression, he declared, must be met with an
“immediate, decisive, & wide-scale response
------ without any geographical restrictions.”
Those four words – “without any geographical restrictions” –
are the ones that should be underlined and read aloud in
every capital that has allowed its territory to be used as
a launchpad for acts of military or economic aggression
against Iran.
Although the directive was delivered to the heads of Iran’s
military branches, its intended audience was not in the
room. The message was directed at the Israeli and US
regimes and, critically, at those states that have
permitted them to use their territory and
airspace for operations against Iran.
This was an official warning issued by a head of state,
spelling out Iranian policy in terms that leave little
room for creative misinterpretation.
The implication is straightforward --------- and devastating in its
simplicity: if you facilitate attacks on Iran from your territory,
that territory is no longer off-limits to Iranian retaliation.
This is not brinkmanship, which is what a state resorts to
when it remains uncertain and seeks to create room for
negotiation. Tehran ---- is drawing the map of the next
potential war in advance and telling its adversaries
precisely where the lines will be drawn.
Decoding the directive
What do these words mean... when considered alongside the
statements made by other Iranian officials in recent weeks?
Two conclusions naturally emerge ---- both pointing to a
fundamental restructuring of Iran’s strategic posture.
The first is the effective lifting of Iran’s self-imposed 2,000-
kilometre limit on its missile range. This... is not mere
speculation. Only days after the Leader met with the
military command, IRGC spokesperson General
Hossein Mohebbi addressed the issue during
a press conference held on the sidelines of
IRGC Aerospace Force Week.
Responding to a direct question about the range limitations
imposed on Iran’s missiles, he offered an unequivocal
answer: “This limitation - has been lifted for us;
however, we must unveil these capabilities
in practice, rather than merely making
empty slogans. Our duty ---- is to
demonstrate our capabilities
in the field of action.”
The limitation has been effectively lifted. Iran intends to
demonstrate this through deployment and potentially
through operational use, rather than relying on
public announcements.
The second conclusion concerns the expansion of the scope
of Iranian retaliation itself – not merely how far Iran’s
weapons can reach, but also.... the categories of
targets it is prepared to strike. This represents
an even more profound shift, and - it is the
development that should keep strategic
planners in Washington and Tel Aviv
awake at night.
The end of a self-imposed ceiling
In Western mainstream media, and even in think tank
publications, the development of longer-range
missiles by Iran, is almost invariably framed
as a future threat: something Tehran might
secretly be working toward, an advanced
capability .....representing the ultimate
objective of a clandestine program.
The same narrative is applied to Iran’s nuclear weapons
potential. Both ------ are portrayed as distant strategic
milestones that Iran is secretly striving to achieve.
The reality, however, could not be further removed from
this characterization, and understanding why --- is
essential to grasping the scale of the strategic
miscalculation made by the US and Israel.
Iran has not pursued nuclear weapons, as a matter of
deliberate policy, a position reinforced by the official
religious and legal prohibition --- issued by the
martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution,
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.
This is not a question of technical inability but of official
defense doctrine. The same principle applies to Iran’s
missile technology. Tehran has not pursued missiles
with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometres because,
until now, it saw no strategic necessity for
doing so.
Its security interests and the threats it faced -- were primarily
regional, and its missile program was calibrated accordingly.
The 2,000-kilometre ceiling was a policy choice, not a
technical constraint.
This distinction is critical. The prevailing Western narrative
assumes that developing longer-range missiles represents
a technological challenge Iran must first overcome. In
reality, there are two distinct technical pathways
through which Iran could rapidly field extended
-range strike systems, both relying on
technologies that have already
been demonstrated ---- and
operationally deployed.
The first pathway involves modifications to Iran’s existing
missile arsenal, particularly the Khorramshahr family.
The Khorramshahr-1 and Khorramshahr-4 .....are
designed to carry warheads weighing up to
two tonnes over ranges of approximately
2,000 kilometres.
The physics governing ballistic missile range ---- involve the
relationship between payload weight, fuel mass, and stage
configuration. Reducing the warhead's weight – whether
by replacing a two-tonne conventional warhead with a
lighter payload or adopting a multiple-reentry-vehicle
configuration carrying several smaller warheads –
could substantially extend the missile's range.
A modified Khorramshahr variant with a reduced payload
could plausibly achieve ranges of 3,000 to 4,000 kms.
The Khorramshahr family ....can trade payload for range
The second pathway is more ambitious and potentially more
consequential. The engineering gap between a multi-stage
satellite launch vehicle and an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) is not necessarily insurmountable.
Rather, it involves adapting and refining technologies
for a different operational purpose.
Iran’s civilian space program has operated several multi-stage
space launch vehicles over the years. The Qaem family, the
Qased, and the Zuljanah programs --- demonstrate Iran’s
work on multi-stage propulsion systems using solid,
liquid, and hybrid propellants.
Many of these systems are designed for mobile launch
operations, rather than relying exclusively on fixed
launch facilities.
Through the development and testing of these systems,
Iran has demonstrated its experience .......with several
technologies relevant to longer-range ballistic missile
development. These include multi-stage propulsion,
stage separation, guidance systems, and
payload deployment.
However, a successful satellite launch does not, by itself,
establish that a country has mastered the full range of
capabilities required, for an operational intermediate-
range ballistic missile or ICBM. Atmospheric reentry,
warhead survivability, accuracy, and the demands
of military deployment ......present additional
engineering challenges.
Nevertheless, Iran’s repeated development and testing of
multi-stage space launch vehicles provide an important
indication of the technological foundation upon which
it could pursue longer-range missile systems.
The Qaem-100 space launch vehicle is a technology
demonstrator that makes the distinction between
a ‘space program’ ...and ‘extended-range strike
capability’ a matter of intent, not capability.
The provocative actions of the Israeli regime and the
US, have not forced Iran to develop entirely new
technologies from scratch. Rather, they have
removed the policy constraint ......that kept
existing capabilities within defined limits.
Iran is not racing to catch up. It is lifting the
restrictions on what it already possesses.
Expanding... the battlefield: US
bases beyond the Persian Gulf
The second conclusion to be drawn from the Leader’s
remarks concerns the potential expansion of the
scope of Iranian retaliatory attacks. Here - the
picture becomes considerably more complex,
with far-reaching implications for the US
and its regional partners.
During the 40-day imposed war, Iran launched extensive
retaliatory attacks against the US military network
across the Persian Gulf. Strikes against facilities
in the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia, followed by attacks on US assets in
Jordan after the US violated the ceasefire,
demonstrated Iran’s ability to threaten
US forward operating bases -- across
the region.
These operations highlighted the development of an anti-
access strategy designed to undermine the operational
effectiveness of US military installations.
The consequences of this strategy became increasingly
apparent in the period that followed. The operational
viability of several of these facilities came under
serious scrutiny, with serious questions
emerging about their long-term
usefulness in a potential
renewed conflict.
The US subsequently relocated some of its military assets
away from the region. A substantial share of US strike-
support operations is now concentrated in the Israeli-
occupied territories, supplemented by a network of
bases, aerial refueling missions, and bomber
operations originating outside West Asia,
primarily --- from Europe.
Countries - including the UK, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany,
Italy, and Cyprus have played various roles in facilitating
these operations through access to their territory and
airspace, which was even admitted by NATO chief
Mark Rutte recently.
These activities ...are not entirely concealed. Flight tracks
associated with US' B-52 and B-1 bomber missions, aerial
refueling patterns ---- and the operational orbits of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) platforms are publicly observable and
have been documented.
Against this backdrop, the potential extension of Iran’s
missile range raises the prospect of a much broader
geographical scope for any future confrontation.
US military installations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe
could consequently attract greater strategic attention.
Unlike deeply fortified or underground military
complexes..... many conventional airbases
have infrastructure..... that is inherently
exposed -- including runways, aircraft
parking areas, fuel storage facilities,
ammunition depots, and command-
and-control systems.
The central concern, therefore, is that any expansion of
Iran’s missile capabilities - could alter the geographical
parameters of a future war, bringing additional US
military installations and logistical hubs into the
strategic calculations of Tehran.
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the largest permanent US
military installation in Africa, represents another
strategically significant category of potential
targets. With the operational role.... of the
Persian Gulf basing network diminished
----- Camp Lemonnier’s strategic
importance -- has grown
considerably.
The installation serves as a hub for intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and strike-coordination activities across
the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula for the US-
Israeli war machine. It also falls within the range of
Iran’s existing missile capabilities ------- quite apart
from any potential extension of those capabilities.
The strategic logic follows the broader approach Iran has
sought to establish through its anti-access strategy.
Iranian retaliatory attacks --- have challenged the
viability of US military basing arrangements in
the Persian Gulf - and increased the costs of
maintaining forward operating positions in
the region.
Extensive damage to US tanker aircraft, airborne early-
warning and control (AWACS) platforms, and recon
systems at facilities including Muwaffaq al-Salti
Air Base in Jordan and Prince Sultan Air Base
in Saudi Arabia has underscored the
vulnerability of critical military
support infrastructure.
These developments reflect the growing importance
of intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and strike
coordination in modern missile warfare.
Extending this strategic approach.. to
installations in the Balkans, Eastern
Europe, & the Horn of Africa, could
place additional pressure - on the
infrastructure supporting the US
military operations against Iran.
Furthermore, as US military assets become increasingly
concentrated in the Israeli-occupied territories, US'
support infrastructure there could assume greater
importance in Iran’s strategic calculations. Aerial
refueling assets supporting Israeli & US combat
operations are concentrated at a relatively
limited number of locations, including
Ovda and Ben Gurion airports.
These installations represent important logistical components
of sustained air operations. Any disruption to their operations
could complicate the maintenance of combat air patrols and
the execution of long-range strike missions.
Then there is Diego Garcia. The British Indian Ocean Territory
has assumed renewed strategic significance as the United
States adjusts its military posture... following the reduced
operational viability of several Persian Gulf installations.
The base hosts US bomber rotations and serves as a staging
point for long-range military operations across West Asia. If
Iran successfully develops & deploys longer-range missile
systems, Diego Garcia could become part of the strategic
calculations surrounding any expanded confrontation.
Located approximately 3,000 kilometres from Iranian
territory, the installation illustrates the geographical
implications of a potential extension....... of Iran’s
missile capabilities.
The central argument...... is not if Iran would succeed in
destroying every one of these installations. Rather, it is
that the number of locations from which the US could
conduct aggression against Iran ....while remaining
beyond the potential reach of Iranian retaliation,
may be diminishing.
That is the broader operational significance of the
phrase “without any geographical restrictions.”
Diego Garcia is the linchpin of US long-range power
projection in the Indian Ocean, and is now within
Iran’s evolving reach.
The undersea front: Severing
the arteries of the digital war
The next area of expansion in Iran’s response doctrine is
one that has received relatively little public attention,
despite having been explicitly identified by a senior
Iranian official: undersea internet cables.
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Major
General Mohsen Rezaei, has publicly stated that under-
sea internet cables in the region could be included
among Iran’s potential targets in the event of a
renewed aggression against the country.
This is not a threat conveyed through back channels or
inferred from speculation. It is a publicly articulated
position attributed to a senior figure involved in
Iran’s national security strategy.
The significance of this declaration becomes clearer when
the vulnerability of the infrastructure is considered. The
undersea fibre-optic cable systems carrying internet
traffic for the Persian Gulf states, as well as major
Europe-to-Asia data routes, pass through
maritime corridors of considerable
strategic importance -- including
waters where Iran maintains a
significant naval presence.
These cables form a critical part of the global
communications infrastructure, supporting
financial transactions, government
communications, commercial
activity, and international
data exchange.
The potential disruption is particularly concerning
because undersea cables, are difficult to protect
continuously across their entire length. Damage
can result from --- deliberate interference,
maritime accidents, or natural events,
while identifying the precise location
of a fault and organizing repairs...
can be challenging.
Although specialized underwater equipment and trained
personnel are required to conduct deliberate sabotage,
the broader vulnerability of these systems is
well established.
The asymmetry is significant. A relatively localized incident
can disrupt communications across multiple countries and
place substantial pressure on regional connectivity.
Restoration, meanwhile, depends on specialized cable-repair
vessels, technical crews, suitable weather conditions... and
access to the affected maritime area. These repair vessels
are limited in number and operated by a relatively small
group of specialized companies --- creating additional
logistical constraints, in a major international crisis.
The strategic significance, therefore, extends well beyond the
physical cables themselves. It concerns the vulnerability of
the digital infrastructure upon which regional economies,
international commerce, and critical government
services.... increasingly depend.
Major international underwater internet
cables pass through regional waters.
Iran itself is not as heavily dependent on these undersea
cable systems for its international connectivity, relying
instead predominantly on land-based cable routes.
This creates a potential asymmetry: disruption to undersea
cable networks serving the Persian Gulf states and major
Asia-to-Europe transit routes ----- could have significant
consequences for regional connectivity ....without
producing a comparable loss of connectivity
within Iran.
The implications extend far beyond civilian inconvenience.
US military assets operating across the region also rely,
to varying degrees --- on the same commercial
communications infrastructure, to conduct,
coordinate, and support their activities.
The communications networks linking US installations
across the region.... the data connections supporting
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
operations, & the systems facilitating coordination
among naval, air, and ground forces all depend, at
least in part, on civilian telecommunications
infrastructure.
Much of this infrastructure is physically exposed
and potentially vulnerable to disruption in ways
that military planners may not have fully
accounted for.
The result -- is a broader strategic vulnerability: damage
to ostensibly civilian communications networks could
have consequences extending well beyond the
commercial and civilian sectors, potentially
affecting the continuity and coordination
of military operations across the region.
Iran’s growing UUV fleet gives it the capability
to safely reach cables on the seabed.
The infrastructure in question is being used to support
military aggression against Iranian territory, a fact
that Tehran could invoke in asserting that it
constitutes a legitimate military target
under the international laws of
armed conflict.
In such a scenario, the Persian Gulf states could face
partial or even widespread internet disruption.
Commercial operations, financial systems,
government services, and military
communications ......could all
be affected.
The resulting ripple effects... across the global
economy, could be immediate and substantial.
The energy factor
Iran has been subjected to a prolonged and illegal maritime
siege by the United States Navy. Its oil exports have been
targeted, its tankers seized, and its commercial shipping
subjected to harassment. Throughout this period,
Tehran has maintained a consistent position:
the security and uninterrupted flow of
energy can be guaranteed for every
one in the region, or - they can be
guaranteed for no one.
During the 40-day imposed war, Iran demonstrated its ability
to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and
threaten energy infrastructure ....across the region. The
strategic waterway was effectively closed, prompting
the insurance markets that underpin global maritime
trade, to respond accordingly.
What the Leader’s directive suggests, is that Iran may be
prepared to extend its maritime denial strategy beyond
the Strait of Hormuz itself. Rather than limiting its
response to the narrow passage, Tehran could
seek.... to expand the geographical scope of
disruption eastward, bringing oil terminals,
export facilities, & pipeline infrastructure
beyond the Strait ------ into the broader
strategic equation.
This includes loading facilities, single-point mooring systems,
and subsea pipelines connecting offshore production sites,
to onshore processing infrastructure.
Together, these facilities form an essential part of the
region’s energy export network and illustrate how a
wider confrontation could affect not only maritime
traffic but also the infrastructure that sustains
global energy supplies.
The flow of energy through the Persian Gulf has always
been Iran’s ultimate deterrent. The question now
is how wide the closure zone becomes.
If Israel and the US proceed with their threatened attacks
on Iranian energy infrastructure, Tehran may conclude
that it has no choice but to retaliate by inflicting
long-term damage on the region’s energy
production capacity.
This would go - far beyond temporarily disrupting the flow of
oil. It would mean physically disabling production facilities,
refineries, processing plants, and export terminals --- on a
scale that could take years, rather than weeks, to repair.
The global consequences could be immediate and severe,
as a sudden, sustained reduction in oil supplies - would
send prices sharply higher & risk triggering economic
crises across multiple regions of the world.
There is another dimension that has received relatively little
public attention. Energy producers and pipeline networks
located outside the Persian Gulf, including... to the north
of Iran and in other parts of the region, have continued
supplying energy to the Israeli regime during the war.
Some of these supplies contribute to the fuel chain sustaining
Israel’s military aggression, including the aviation fuel used
by aircraft operating from Israeli military bases to strike
Iranian targets. In Tehran’s strategic calculus, energy
infrastructure that continues to sustain Israel’s war
effort could, therefore, become part of a much
broader equation.
The scope of any Iranian maritime-denial strategy could
also extend beyond the Persian Gulf. The Arabian Sea,
the northern Indian Ocean, and potentially --- the
approaches to the Mediterranean --- could
become additional theatres of pressure.
Shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, already affected by
Yemeni military operations in the Red Sea, could face further
disruption. Iran’s naval and asymmetric capabilities give it
options to threaten commercial maritime traffic - across a
substantial area of the Indian Ocean and the approaches
to the Red Sea, although the extent to which it could
sustain such pressure, would depend on the course
of the war and the responses of other regional and
international powers.
The nuclear dimension: Retaliation in kind
Iran’s declared nuclear facilities – sites operating under the
framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in various
cases, subject to intense International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards – have been attacked repeatedly
by the US and Israeli regimes.
These... were not simply unidentified installations. They
included facilities that Iran had declared to the
international community and that had been
subject to international inspection and
monitoring. Tehran did not respond to
those attacks by targeting nuclear
facilities in the Israel-occupied
territories. Instead it absorbed
strikes - against its declared
nuclear infrastructure, and
retaliated via other means.
That restraint, however -- may now be under increasing
pressure. Further attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities
have been threatened. If they are carried out, Tehran
could abandon its previous restraint and seek to
retaliate against elements of Israel’s
nuclear infrastructure.
Such a response would mark a profound escalation: rather
than targeting civilian nuclear facilities, Iran could seek
to place Israel’s own nuclear weapons program within
the strategic equation, and Iran has already
demonstrated its ability to do that
during the 40-day war.
The Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Centre,
commonly known as the Dimona complex, is
widely regarded as the central hub of
Israel’s nuclear weapons program.
It is associated with the country’s
nuclear warhead production
infrastructure.
The Soreq Nuclear Research Centre -- south of Tel Aviv,
represents another important node, with research and
development capabilities relevant to the nuclear
program. Other facilities linked to Israel’s
military-industrial complex ---- including
sites... at Yodefat, Rafael, Tirosh, and
Eilabun, have been associated with
various aspects of warhead-
related research, storage,
and delivery systems.
These facilities are fixed installations with known
locations, and none is inherently invulnerable.
Iran’s precision-strike capabilities --- have
improved significantly.
A determined Iranian attack on the Dimona complex
or other facilities associated with Israel’s nuclear
infrastructure would represent a major
escalation and, in Tehran’s view, a
reciprocal response ---- to further
attacks on Iranian nuclear sites.
The precedent, as Iran sees it, has already been
established by the Israeli regime and the US. By
striking Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, they
demonstrated their willingness to treat such
installations as military targets, despite
their declared status and international
safeguards. Tehran is now signaling
that it may apply the same logic
--- in response.
This is one of the potential chains
of escalation ---- set in motion by
the attacks on Iran.
Corporate and technology infrastructure
Iran -- could also expand its target set to include US
corporate interests across the region, particularly
in the A.I. and high-technology sectors.
This category of infrastructure has featured to a limited
extent in the previous two wars, but .......an expanded
confrontation could bring regional data centres, AI
facilities, semiconductor fabrication facilities, and
research and development installations ------ into
sharper focus.
Intel’s facility in the Israeli-occupied territories, one of
the company’s major manufacturing sites, represents
a multibillion-dollar investment and an important part
of the global semiconductor supply chain. Other US
technology companies .......maintain substantial
operations in Israel and the wider region -----
including cloud-computing infrastructure,
AI research facilities and partnerships
in defense technology.
Iran has previously threatened to target some of these
interests. In the context of an expanded war, Tehran
could conclude that such facilities contribute to the
technological infrastructure supporting Israeli and
US aggression - from AI systems used in targeting
and intelligence analysis - to communications
networks connecting military assets. Their
potential military applications ------- raise
questions about their dual-use status.
The economic consequences of attacks on these facilities
could extend far beyond the immediate physical damage.
The global semiconductor supply chain ------ is highly
interconnected, and the loss of a major fabrication
facility could affect industries across multiple
countries.
Disabling data centres that host cloud services could disrupt
businesses, government operations, and other users
throughout the region and potentially beyond.
Iran is acutely aware of these vulnerabilities. The prospect
of cascading disruption across critical technology supply
chains and digital infrastructure may therefore form part
of a broader deterrence strategy, even if the credibility
and practical limits of such threats remain uncertain.
Intel’s Fab 28 in Kiryat Gat ---- is one of the largest
private-sector investments in Israel.
Infrastructure front: Water, power,
and the fragility of desert states
If Iran’s critical civilian infrastructure – its power plants, water
systems, and industrial base – is threatened or attacked, it
may retaliate against the infrastructure that makes life in
the Persian Gulf states possible.... and sustains the
presence of US military personnel in the region.
This requires understanding something that military planners
in Washington and Tel Aviv -- appear to have overlooked: the
desert states of the Persian Gulf ------- were not historically
equipped to support populations on their present scale.
The millions of people living in these countries –
including large migrant-worker populations
and expatriate communities – depend on
economic and social systems, built
over several decades.
Those systems, in turn, rely on infrastructure that is
extensive, concentrated, and potentially vulnerable.
Electricity supplies power the air conditioning that makes life
in these climates tolerable. Desalination plants provide the
fresh water that sustains major cities. Food supply chains
import the vast quantities of provisions needed.... to
support these populations.
Each of these essential services depends on a relatively
small number of critical infrastructure nodes, many of
which are fixed and difficult to replace quickly.
Iran could therefore seek to place electricity generation and
water desalination facilities in Persian Gulf states that host
US forces --------- within the scope of its retaliation.
The consequences -- could reverse decades of development
and impose severe costs on the host countries themselves.
Israel faces some of the same vulnerabilities, arguably to
an even greater degree. Like the Arab states of the
Persian Gulf - it relies heavily on a desalination
capacity concentrated at a limited number
of sites.
The regime’s electricity system.. is also relatively compact,
with generation capacity concentrated in a comparatively
small number of facilities. Serious damage to key
components could therefore have far-reaching
consequences for the national grid's stability.
Israel cannot assume that the infrastructure sustaining its
settler population will remain untouched if Iranian civilian
infrastructure comes under attack.
The precedent has been set by the very states now
threatening to widen the war of aggression: states
that have chosen to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities,
energy infrastructure, industrial base - & civilian
economy. The consequences of that precedent
could extend ------ far beyond Iran.
They would be borne across the region
– and potentially by the wider world.
The warning has been sent
The warning has been delivered clearly. Iran maintains that
it does not want another war. It has repeated this position
through official channels and public statements, and has
shown its strategic posture as fundamentally defensive.
But it is equally clear that the country will not surrender its
security, sovereignty, or right to exist as an independent
state to satisfy the demands of powers that have
shown neither the ability nor the willingness
to coexist with it peacefully.
Israeli and US political leaders appear poised.... to draw the
region into another confrontation. The thinking behind this
course of action resembles that which drove previous
rounds of escalation: the belief that applying greater
pressure will produce an outcome that earlier
campaigns failed to achieve. Repeating the
same approach ------ while expecting a
fundamentally different result.... is
a classic strategic miscalculation.
Another round of war could have consequences far more
extensive than those of previous confrontations. Energy
disruption could reach unprecedented levels. Damage
to the global economy could take years to repair. The
resulting instability - could spread across the region
and beyond, placing existing political & economic
arrangements under extraordinary strain.
Infrastructure essential to the lives of millions, could become
entangled in the war. Communications networks could suffer
serious disruption. Energy supplies underpinning the global
economy could be interrupted.
And the nuclear dimension – one that governments have
worked for decades to contain ---- could become part of
the confrontation in ways that would be extraordinarily
difficult to control.
Those who dismissed... earlier warnings about the Strait of
Hormuz, treated Iran’s declarations as bluster, or assumed
that Tehran would not retaliate against attacks on its
territory -------- seriously underestimated the risks.
The same applies to those who regarded the 2,000-kilometre
range ceiling as an immutable limitation, assumed that
undersea communications cables were beyond the
scope of the war, or believed that US military
installations in Europe were necessarily
beyond Iran’s reach.
In each case, assumptions about what Iran would or
would not do deserve to be examined against the
course of events -- and the capabilities Tehran
has demonstrated.
The warning - has been issued. Iran has outlined that a
new doctrine will govern its response, & it possesses
capabilities ------ that regional and international
governments cannot afford to dismiss.
The remaining question is -- whether the governments with
the power to prevent another war, will choose to exercise
it – or whether they will once again gamble with the lives
and livelihoods of millions
Written by Arman Shariati
Arman Shariati specialises in defense matters,
with a focus on aerospace developments.